Responding to Objections Lesson 98 of 157

Stating the Problem Clearly

Understanding the Different Forms of the Problem of Evil

The problem of evil is often called the most powerful objection to belief in God. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good, why does evil exist? Why do children suffer from cancer? Why do natural disasters kill thousands? Why does God allow genocide, torture, and abuse? Before we can respond to this challenge, we must understand it clearly. The problem of evil comes in several forms, and each requires careful analysis.

Why This Problem Matters

The problem of evil is not merely an intellectual puzzle for philosophers. It's a deeply personal struggle for many people—including Christians. When tragedy strikes, when suffering seems senseless, when evil appears to triumph, we all ask "Why?"

This question has driven some away from faith. The sheer weight of suffering in the world seems incompatible with a loving God. As philosopher David Hume famously asked: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?"

Christians must take this problem seriously—not because it defeats our faith, but because it addresses the deepest questions of human existence. We serve a God who Himself entered into suffering. Our response to evil must be both intellectually honest and pastorally sensitive.

Two Audiences

When addressing the problem of evil, we face two different audiences:

The intellectual skeptic raises evil as an argument against God's existence. They want logical analysis and philosophical response.

The suffering person cries out from pain, seeking comfort and meaning. They need presence, compassion, and hope more than arguments.

Both audiences deserve thoughtful engagement, but with different approaches. In this section, we focus primarily on the intellectual problem while recognizing that real suffering requires pastoral care beyond philosophical answers.

The Logical Problem of Evil

The logical problem of evil claims that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically incompatible—that it's impossible for both to be true. The argument runs:

The Logical Argument

Premise 1: If God exists, He is omnipotent (all-powerful).

Premise 2: If God exists, He is omniscient (all-knowing).

Premise 3: If God exists, He is omnibenevolent (perfectly good).

Premise 4: An omnipotent being could prevent any evil.

Premise 5: An omniscient being would know about all evil.

Premise 6: An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evil.

Premise 7: Evil exists.

Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist.

The argument claims that these premises are mutually exclusive—you cannot consistently hold all of them. Since evil obviously exists (Premise 7), and the divine attributes seem clearly defined (Premises 1-3), God must not exist.

Evaluating the Logical Problem

For this argument to work, the premises must be necessarily true—true in all possible worlds. But are they?

The critical premises are 4-6. Is it true that an omnipotent being could prevent any evil? That an omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evil?

Not necessarily. Consider:

Against Premise 4: Omnipotence doesn't mean the ability to do the logically impossible. God cannot make a married bachelor or a square circle. If creating free creatures who always choose good is logically impossible, then even an omnipotent God couldn't do it. Evil might be the unavoidable byproduct of a greater good (free will) that even omnipotence cannot achieve without it.

Against Premise 6: A perfectly good being might permit evil for the sake of greater goods. A good parent permits the pain of vaccination for the child's health. A good God might permit suffering that produces compassion, courage, and spiritual growth. The assumption that a good God would prevent all evil is not obviously true—it depends on whether permitting some evil could serve greater purposes.

Philosopher Alvin Plantinga's "Free Will Defense" (which we'll examine in detail in the next lesson) has convinced most philosophers that the logical problem of evil fails. It's possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. This possibility is enough to defeat the claim of logical impossibility.

Today, few philosophers press the logical problem of evil. The consensus is that it doesn't succeed—the existence of God and evil are not logically incompatible.

Scholarly Consensus

Even atheist philosopher William Rowe acknowledges: "Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim."

And J.L. Mackie, who formulated a famous version of the logical problem, later conceded that Plantinga's defense was successful: "Since this defense is formally possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another."

The Evidential Problem of Evil

Since the logical problem has largely failed, most contemporary discussions focus on the evidential (or probabilistic) problem of evil. This argument doesn't claim that God and evil are logically incompatible but that evil makes God's existence unlikely.

The Evidential Argument

Premise 1: There exist instances of intense suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

Premise 2: An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

Conclusion: Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being (i.e., God does not exist).

This argument is more subtle. It doesn't claim that every evil must have a justifying reason—only that some evils appear to have no such reason. These are called "gratuitous" or "pointless" evils. Their existence, the argument claims, makes God's existence improbable.

The Challenge of Gratuitous Evil

The evidential problem gains force from specific cases that seem pointless:

A fawn trapped in a forest fire, suffering for days before dying—no human witnesses, no apparent purpose.

A child who dies of a painful disease after a short, suffering-filled life.

The Holocaust—six million Jews systematically murdered, including a million children.

These evils seem gratuitous—suffering without apparent redemptive purpose. If God exists and is good, why would He permit them?

Evaluating the Evidential Problem

The evidential argument depends on a crucial assumption: that we would be able to discern God's reasons for permitting evil if such reasons existed. But is this assumption warranted?

Consider the cognitive gap between humans and God. If God exists, His knowledge is infinite; ours is finite. His perspective is eternal; ours is temporal. He sees how all events connect across history; we see only fragments. Is it reasonable to expect that we could identify His reasons?

This response is called "skeptical theism." It doesn't claim to know God's reasons but questions whether we're in a position to judge that there are no reasons. The absence of a discernible purpose doesn't mean there is no purpose—it may mean the purpose is beyond our comprehension.

Analogy: A child may not understand why a parent allows painful medical treatment. The child experiences only pain and cannot grasp the larger purpose. But the parent's reasons are real, even if the child can't perceive them. Similarly, our inability to see God's purposes doesn't mean they don't exist.

"For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the LORD. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts."

— Isaiah 55:8-9 (ESV)

The Emotional Problem of Evil

Beyond the intellectual arguments lies the emotional problem of evil—the visceral reaction to suffering that makes belief in God feel impossible. This is not a logical argument but a psychological barrier.

When someone loses a child, when disaster destroys a community, when evil seems to triumph unchecked—intellectual arguments can feel hollow. The sufferer doesn't want philosophy; they want God to show up, to explain, to make it stop.

The emotional problem requires a different response than the intellectual problem:

Presence over arguments. Job's friends started well—sitting with him in silence for seven days. They failed when they started explaining.

Lament over answers. The Psalms model honest complaint to God. "How long, O Lord?" is a prayer, not a heresy.

The cross over explanations. God's ultimate answer to suffering is not an explanation but a Person—the God who entered suffering, bore it, and conquered it.

Intellectual responses to evil are important but insufficient. They must be complemented by pastoral care, Christian community, and the presence of Christ with those who suffer.

Types of Evil

To respond effectively, we must distinguish different types of evil:

Moral Evil

Moral evil results from the free choices of moral agents—murder, theft, cruelty, oppression. Humans (and perhaps other free beings) are the immediate cause. The question here is why God permits free creatures to choose evil.

Natural Evil

Natural evil results from natural processes—earthquakes, diseases, floods, predation. No human choice directly causes them (though human choices may contribute). The question here is why God designed or permits a world with such features.

The Difference Matters

These types require different responses. Moral evil is addressed through the free will defense—God permits it because free will is valuable and cannot exist without the possibility of misuse. Natural evil is more challenging—what justifies earthquakes and cancer?

We'll address moral evil through the free will defense in the next lesson, and natural evil in the lesson following.

A Note on Terminology

Philosophers distinguish between a theodicy and a defense:

A theodicy attempts to explain God's actual reasons for permitting evil. It claims to know why God allows suffering.

A defense merely shows that it's possible God has morally sufficient reasons, without claiming to know what those reasons are.

A defense is easier to establish and sufficient to defeat the logical problem of evil. But many seek more—they want to understand God's purposes, not just know that purposes might exist.

What Christians Must Affirm

Before developing responses, let's be clear about what Christians must affirm:

God is omnipotent. He has all power—there are no limits to what He can do except logical impossibilities and self-imposed constraints.

God is omniscient. He knows all things—past, present, future, and all possibilities.

God is perfectly good. He is holy, just, loving, and righteous. He never does wrong and always acts consistently with His perfect character.

Evil is real. It's not an illusion (contra Christian Science), not merely the absence of good (though it includes that), and not something to be embraced or ignored.

Evil is temporary. God will ultimately defeat evil, judge the wicked, and restore all things. The current situation is not the final word.

Any response to the problem of evil must maintain these commitments. We cannot solve the problem by diminishing God's power, knowledge, or goodness, or by denying the reality of evil.

"The LORD is righteous in all his ways and kind in all his works."

— Psalm 145:17 (ESV)

The Christian Advantage

Before feeling defensive about the problem of evil, Christians should recognize that we have resources other worldviews lack:

We can call evil "evil." On naturalism, evil is just stuff we don't like—there's no objective standard. Christianity grounds real evil in deviation from God's character and will.

We have a framework. The biblical narrative—creation, fall, redemption, restoration—provides context for understanding evil's origin, presence, and ultimate defeat.

We have a suffering God. In Christ, God entered suffering, experienced it from within, and conquered it. We don't worship a distant deity but an Emmanuel—God with us in our pain.

We have hope. Evil will not have the last word. God will judge, restore, and renew. Suffering is real but temporary; glory is coming.

The problem of evil is a problem for everyone—but Christianity has more resources for addressing it than any other worldview.

Conclusion: Approaching the Problem Rightly

The problem of evil is real and serious. Christians should not dismiss it, minimize it, or pretend we have easy answers. Suffering is terrible, evil is monstrous, and honest people struggle to reconcile them with a good God.

But the problem is not unanswerable. The logical problem fails—God and evil are not logically incompatible. The evidential problem depends on assumptions we have reason to question—our ability to discern divine purposes. And the emotional problem, while real, calls for pastoral care alongside intellectual response.

In the following lessons, we'll develop specific responses: the free will defense for moral evil, the fall and cosmic redemption for natural evil, and the greater-good theodicy for the purpose of suffering. Each contributes to a cumulative case that Christian theism can account for evil while maintaining God's perfect character.

The problem of evil is not a reason to abandon faith but an invitation to deeper faith—faith that trusts God even when we don't understand, that holds onto His goodness even in darkness, and that hopes for the day when every tear will be wiped away and evil will be no more.

"He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away."

— Revelation 21:4

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Discussion Questions

  1. What's the difference between the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil? Why is this distinction important for how we respond?
  2. The lesson distinguishes between intellectual skeptics and suffering people as two audiences for the problem of evil. How should our approach differ for each? What dangers arise from using the wrong approach?
  3. "Skeptical theism" questions whether we're in a position to judge that God has no reasons for permitting evil. Is this a satisfying response, or does it feel like a cop-out? How would you explain its validity to a skeptic?